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Abstract
We examine the efficiency and distributional impacts of greenhouse gas policies directed toward the elec-
tricity sector in a model that links a “top-down” general equilibrium representation of the U.S. economy
with a “bottom-up” electricity-sector dispatch and capacity expansion model. Our modeling framework
features a high spatial and temporal resolution of electricity supply and demand, including renewable
energy resources and generating technologies, while representing CO2 abatement options in non-electric
sectors as well as economy-wide interactions. We find that clean and renewable energy standards entail
substantial efficiency costs compared to an economy-wide carbon pricing policy such as a cap-and-trade
program or a carbon tax, and that these policies are regressive across the income distribution. The geo-
graphical distribution of cost is characterized by high burdens for regions that depend on non-qualifying
generation fuels, primarily coal. Regions with abundant hydro power and wind resources, and a relatively
clean generation mix in the absence of policy, are among the least impacted. An important shortcoming
of energy standards vis-a`-vis a first-best carbon pricing policy is that no revenue is generated that can be
used to alter unintended distributional consequences.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Following the failure in 2010 to pass a comprehensive cap-and-trade bill in the U.S., analysts
and policymakers have called for new or more stringent policies to curb greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in the electric power sector. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama
announced the goal of producing 80% of electricity from “clean” energy sources by 2035, and the
2011 Economic Report of the President indicates that a Clean Energy Standard (CES) is an
important component of meeting the U.S. pledge, as part of the United Nations climate
conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, to reduce total CO2 emissions. The idea of a federal
CES has been garnering bi-partisan support in Washington, D.C., and at latest count, thirty-six
states (plus the District of Columbia) already employ renewable energy standards (RES) or CES
programs, most of them mandating that 15 to 25% of total electricity production by 2020 has to
come from renewable or “clean” sources (DSIRE, 2011). Energy standards in existing and
proposed regulation differ with regard to the list of fuel sources included. Unlike a RES program,
most CES proposals would credit not only renewable sources, like wind, solar, bio-power,
hydropower and geothermal, but would also credit non-emitting non-renewable sources like
nuclear energy, and would give partial crediting to certain other technologies, such as gas and coal
technologies with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and natural gas combined cycle plants.
This paper examines the efficiency and distributional implications of RES and CES regulation
in the U.S. electric power sector employing a numerical simulation model that is uniquely
well-suited to assessing both economy-wide and electric sector impacts. We investigate the
impacts of introducing a federal energy standard, formulated with and without a particular
emphasis on incentivizing renewable energy, on economy-wide costs and emissions reductions,
relating these impacts to changes in regional electricity generation and capacity (shifts to low
carbon fuels and renewable sources), and changes in general equilibrium products and factor
prices. We explore how the costs are distributed across households that differ by region and
income. We compare the cost effectiveness and the distribution of impacts of such policies
vis-a`-vis a theoretical first-best permit market equilibrium (or a carbon tax) where marginal
abatement costs across all sectors in the economy are equalized (see, e.g, Metcalf, 2009).
Several studies have examined how the U.S. electric sector responds to the imposition of a
RES or CES. Besides assessments that evaluate performance of state-level RES programs based
on past experiences (Langnissa and Wise, 2003; Wiser et al., 2007), some prior studies have
employed simulation models to estimate impacts of federal RES/CES policies. A series of studies
by the Energy Information Administration (Energy Information Administration, 2007, 2009a)
uses the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) (Energy Information Administration, 2009b)
to examine a federal RES as specified under the American Clean Energy and Security Act and,
more recently, a CES proposal that is closely related to the proposal by the Obama Administration
(Energy Information Administration, 2011). Also based on the NEMS model, Palmer et al. (2010)
and Palmer et al. (2011b) analyze a range of renewable and clean electricity standards aimed at
promoting renewable and low-carbon sources of electricity. Palmer and Burtraw (2005) and Paul
et al. (2011) use the Haiku model, a partial equilibrium model of the U.S. electricity sector, to
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compare the cost effectiveness of a federal RES and Renewable Energy Production Credit and to
study the impacts of a federal CES on electricity prices and CO2 emissions. The National Energy
Renewable Laboratory (NREL) analyzed the potential impacts of proposed national renewable
electricity standard (RES) legislation using the Renewable Energy Deployment System (ReEDS)
model, a linear programming generation, capacity expansion, and transmission model (Sullivan
et al., 2009). Morris et al. (2010) employ a general equilibrium model with a top-down
formulation of electricity to analyze impacts from combining a RES with a cap-and-trade policy.
The present study differs from earlier work in several ways. First, in contrast with all prior
work1, this analysis combines a general equilibrium (GE) model with a detailed bottom-up
representation of the electric sector based on a decomposition algorithm (Bo¨hringer and
Rutherford, 2009) that exploits the block-diagonal structure of the Jacobian matrix of the
problem. We fully integrate two existing large-scale simulation models, the MIT U.S. Regional
Energy Policy (USREP) model (Rausch et al., 2010, 2011b), a recursive-dynamic multi-region
GE model of the U.S. economy, and NREL’s ReEDS (Renewable Energy Deployment System)
model (Short et al., 2009), a recursive-dynamic linear programming model that simulates the
least-cost expansion of electricity generation capacity and transmission, with detailed treatment of
renewable electric options.
The key innovation of our approach is that electric-sector optimization is fully consistent with
the equilibrium response of the economy including endogenously determined electricity demand,
fuel prices, and goods and factor prices. Our integrated assessment allows us to provide
theoretically sound welfare estimates, and enables us to assess the cost effectiveness of electricity
standards vis-a`-vis market-based carbon pricing policies by considering abatement opportunities
in all sectors of the economy within a single consistent framework.
Our analysis is also germane to the literature on integrating “top-down” and “bottom-up”
models for carbon policy assessment (see, for example, Hourcade et al., 2006, for an overview).
Economy-wide “top-down” models represent sectoral economic activities and electric generation
technologies through smooth, aggregate production functions. While the strength of these models
is to include economy-wide interactions in an internally consistent framework, they typically lack
detail along a number of important dimensions critical for analyzing electric sector impacts and,
in particular, the potential of renewable energy sources. These include, among others, a
exhaustive representation of all major renewable generation technologies, the characterization of
renewable resources and electricity demand at sufficiently resolved spatial and temporal scales,
capacity investment decisions including back-up for intermittent generation and storage, and
access to and the cost of transmission using a spatially resolved representation of the grid. Our
analysis is the first to embed a detailed electric sector model that includes all of these aspects in a
1 Sugandha et al. (2009) also employ a hybrid top-down bottom-up modeling approach but their modeling frame-
work has considerably less detail with respect to modeling important features of renewable electricity generation.
Furthermore, their analysis does not consider the impacts of CES or RES policies in the electric sector.
3
numerical general equilibrium framework.2 By doing so, we also overcome limitations inherent to
partial equilibrium “bottom-up” electric sector models that typically rely on a simplistic
Marshallian formulation of electricity demand (Lanz and Rausch, 2011) and fail to include
interactions with the broader economic system.
A second major difference from earlier work is the model’s ability to capture distributional
effects. First, the economy-wide model distinguishes larger states and U.S. regions capturing
inter-regional differences in carbon intensity of energy production, consumption, and trade.
Second, within each region the model considers nine households differentiated by income levels.
Households across income classes differ in terms of how income is derived from different sources
and how income is spend across different commodities. This enables us to capture consumer
impacts both on the uses and sources side of income.3 Sources side effects have been shown to be
critical for assessing the incidence of environmental policies (Fullerton and Heutel, 2007; Rausch
et al., 2011a), but the scope of a partial equilibrium electric-sector analysis implies that that those
effects cannot be captured. Our integrated general equilibrium approach thus enables us to trace
distributional impacts in several important dimensions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on CES and
RES policies, with emphasis on the U.S. Section 3 outlines the model’s data sources and structure.
Section 4 presents and interprets results from policy simulations. Section 5 offers conclusions.
2. BACKGROUND ON CLEAN AND RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARDS FOR ELEC-
TRICITY
Under the typical design of an RES or CES, generators earn tradable certificates or credits for
each unit of renewable or clean energy they produce. At the end of the accounting period, each
firm must surrender RES/CES certificates equivalent to its required level of renewable/clean
energy production, defined as a specified share of its total production.
An electricity standard with trading is closely related to the cap-and-trade approach to
pollution control. Many state RES programs are intended as climate policies, and these can be
thought of as CO2 cap-and-trade systems for the electric sector where the difference in carbon
intensity among fuels is ignored. The disregard for differences in carbon content limits the cost
effectiveness of the instrument. Cost effectiveness is also compromised because a RES/CES does
not directly put a price on the externalities associated with fossil-based electricity generation; it
2 In addition, a top-down representation of electricity markets implies that the price of electricity reflects the total
carbon content of generation. This contrasts with real markets (and the bottom-up approach), where the carbon
price is reflected in the electricity price through the carbon content of the marginal producer at a given point in
time (Stavins, 2008).
3 Environmental policies aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions will raise the price of carbon intensive commodi-
ties and disproportionately impact those households who spend larger than average shares of their income on these
commodities. In a general equilibrium setting, environmental regulation also impacts factor prices. Households
which rely heavily on income from factors whose factor prices fall relative to other factor prices will be adversely
impacted. In the public finance literature on tax incidence, the first impact is referred to as a uses of income impact
while the latter a sources of income impact (see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, for a discussion of tax
incidence).
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instead focuses on the ratio of renewable/clean- to fossil-based/”dirty” generation. Because of its
focus on a ratio or input intensity, the RES/CES is equivalent to the combination of a subsidy to
electricity production and tax on emissions. As shown by Holland et al. (2009), the subsidy
component impedes cost effectiveness. In addition, a RES/CES program fails to exploit a broader
range of behavioral responses to reduce CO2 emissions across all sectors of the economy. It may
also not provide the same certainty for achieving a given emissions reductions target as an
economy-wide cap-and-trade system due to potential leakage effects to non-electricity sectors.
RES programs have—since the late 1990s—proliferated at the state level in the U.S. Until
2003, 14 states had enacted RES policies; at latest count, RES policies currently exist in 29 states
and the District of Columbia; seven more states have non-binding goals. Existing RES programs
apply to 47% of U.S. load in 2010. Most of the existing RES programs mandate that 15 to 25% of
total electricity production by 2020 has to come from renewable sources. In general, the
enactment of new RES policies is waning, but states continue to hone existing policies, with a
general trend towards increased stringency of RES targets.4
At the federal level, a number of RES and CES proposals have been considered, but to date no
proposal has been implemented. In the 111th Congress, several electricity portfolio standards have
been proposed including the House-passed H.R. 2454 American Clean Energy and Security Act
of 2009 and three Senate bills: the American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (ACELA);
the Practical Energy and Climate Plan Act (PECPA); and the Clean Energy Standard Act of
(CESA). Both ACES and ACELA have a RES which would have required that, by 2020, 20% and
30% of electricity generation come from renewable sources, respectively. The PECPA and CESA
proposals include CES programs that provide credit for both renewable and lower-emitting,
non-renewable energy sources comprising coal-CCS and new nuclear. Both proposals would
mandate that 30% and 50% of electricity generation come from clean energy by 2030 and 2050,
respectively. In addition, in his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama expressed
support for a CES that would require 80% of electricity generation to come from clean sources by
2035. Following the address, the White House released some general principles for a proposal for
a CES, and more recently President Obama reiterated this call in a March 30, 2011 speech on
energy policy. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether a federal CES or RES will come
forward and how the exact parameters of such a policy would look like.
Other proposals include a CES that would be based on CO2 emissions intensity of power
generation (Aldy, 2011). Such a technology-neutral approach would avoid picking winning
technologies based on a policy decision on how to credit technologies under a portfolio approach,
and promote a cost-effective allocation of emissions reductions within the power sector at a given
point in time as the marginal cost of reducing CO2 are equated across different generators.5
4 See DSIRE (2011), for an overview of existing RES policies. Wiser et al. (2007) provides an introduction to the
history, concept, and design of the RES, and reviews early experience with the policy as applied at the state level.
5 In principle, the CES approach could also be cost-effective in this regard, though this would require extensive credit
trading provisions, allowing coal-intensive generators to exceed the standard by purchasing credits from other
generators that are well below the standard (Parry and Williams III, 2011).
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Significantly, the federal programs would allow tradability of credits within the entire U.S.,
whereas most state policies contain significant statewide or regional limitations on renewable
credit sources. A federal RES/CES program would therefore be at least as cost-effective as a
combination of state-level programs.
3. AN INTEGRATED ECONOMY-ENERGY-ELECTRICITY MODELING FRAMEWORK
We formulate a recursive-dynamic general equilibrium (GE) model of the U.S. economy with
a detailed bottom-up representation of electricity demand, generation, capacity expansion, and
transmission. We embed NREL’s ReEDS (Renewable Energy Deployment System) model (Short
et al., 2009), a recursive-dynamic linear programming model that simulates the least-cost
expansion of electricity generation capacity and transmission, with detailed treatment of
renewable electric options, within the MIT USREP (U.S. Regional Energy Policy) model (Rausch
et al., 2010, 2011b), a multi-region multi-commodity economy-energy GE model of the
U.S. economy. We now turn to an overview of both sub-models and describe our approach to
integrate them.
3.1 General Equilibrium Model
3.1.1 Data
This study makes use of a comprehensive energy-economy dataset that features a consistent
representation of energy markets in physical units as well as detailed accounts of regional
production and bilateral trade for the year 2004. The datset merges detailed state-level data for the
U.S. with national economic and energy data for regions in the rest of the world and is outlined in
detail by Caron and Rausch (2011). Social accounting matrices (SAM) in our hybrid dataset are
based on data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP, 2008), the IMPLAN (IMpact
analysis for PLANning) data (IMPLAN, 2008), and U.S. state-level accounts on energy balances
and prices from the Energy Information Administration (2009c). Table 1 provides an overview of
data sources.
The GTAP provides consistent global accounts of production, consumption, and bilateral trade
as well as consistent accounts of physical energy flows and energy prices. Version 7 of the
database, which is benchmarked to 2004, identifies 113 countries and regions and 57
commodities. The IMPLAN data specifies benchmark economic accounts for the 50 U.S. states
(and the District of Columbia). The dataset includes input-output tables for each state that
identify 509 commodities and existing taxes. The base year for the IMPLAN accounts in the
version we use here is 2006. To improve the characterization of energy markets in the IMPLAN
data, we use least-square optimization techniques to merge IMPLAN data with data on physical
energy quantities and energy prices from the Department of Energy’s State Energy Data System
(SEDS) for 2006 (Energy Information Administration, 2009c).6
6 Aggregation and reconciliation of IMPLAN state-level economic accounts to generate a micro-consistent benchmark
dataset which can be used for model calibration is accomplished using ancillary tools documented in Rausch and
Rutherford (2009).
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Table 1. Data sources for USREP model.
Data and parameters Source
Social accounting matrices bilateral trade
international regions Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP, 2008), Version 7
U.S. states IMPLAN (2008) and gravity analysis
(Lindall et al., 2006)
U.S. state-to-country bilateral trade flows Origin of Movement and State of Destination data series
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010)
Physical energy flows and energy prices
international regions GTAP (2008)
U.S. states State Energy Data System (Energy Information Administration, 2009c)
Fossil fuel reserves U.S. Geological Survey (US Geological Survey, 2009),
and biomass supply U.S. Department of Energy (US Department of Energy, 2009), Dyni (2006)
Oakridge National Laboratories (2009)
Population projections
international regions United Nations (2000, 2001)
U.S. states U.S. Census Bureau (2000)
Marginal personal income tax rates NBER’s TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993)
Trade elasticities Global Trade Analysis Project (2008) and own calibration
Energy demand and supply elasticities Paltsev et al. (2005)
Data for trade flows between regions outside of the U.S. are taken from GTAP (2008) and
reflect UN-COMTRADE bilateral flows. Bilateral state-to-state trade data in the IMPLAN
database are derived using a gravity approach Lindall et al. (2006).7 Bilateral
U.S. state-to-country trade flows are based on the U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics
State Data Series (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Bilateral exports and imports are taken from,
respectively, the Origin of Movement (OM) and State of Destination (SD) data series. The OM
and SD data sets are available at the detailed 6-digit HS classification level, which permits
aggregation to GTAP commodity categories.
We integrate GTAP, IMPLAN/SEDS, and U.S. Census trade data by using least-square
optimization techniques. Our data reconciliation strategy is to hold fixed U.S. trade totals (by
commodity) from GTAP and to minimize the distance between estimated and observed
U.S. Census state-to-country bilateral trade flows and estimated and observed SAM data from
IMPLAN subject to equilibrium constraints.
For this study, we aggregate the dataset to 12 U.S. regions, 2 regions in the rest of the world
(Europe and the “Rest of the World”), 10 commodity groups, and 9 households grouped by
annual income classes (see Table 2). States identified in the model include California, Texas,
7 The IMPLAN Trade Flows Model draws on three data sources: the Oak Ridge National Labs county-to-county
distances by mode of transportation database, the Commodity Flows Survey (CFS) ton-miles data by commodity,
and IMPLAN commodity supply and demand estimates by county.
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 Figure 1. U.S. regions in USREP model.
Florida, and New York, and several other multi-state regional composites. Mapping of states to
aggregated regions is shown in Figure 1. Our commodity aggregation identifies five energy
sectors and five non-energy composites. Energy commodities identified in our study include coal
(COL), natural gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU), refined oil (OIL), and electricity (ELE), which allows
to distinguish energy goods and specify substitutability between fuels in energy demand.
Elsewhere, we distinguish energy-intensive products (EIS), other manufacturing (OTH),
agriculture (AGR), transportation (TRN), and services (SRV). Primary factors in the dataset
include labor, capital, land, and fossil-fuel resources.
Energy supply is regionalized by incorporating data for regional crude oil and natural gas
reserves (US Department of Energy, 2009), coal reserves U.S. Geological Survey (US Geological
Survey, 2009), and shale oil (Dyni, 2006). We derive regional supply curves for biomass from
data from Oakridge National Laboratories (2009) that describes quantity and price pairs for
biomass supply for each state.
Our dataset permits calculation of existing taxes rates comprising sector- and region-specific
ad valorem output taxes, payroll taxes and capital income taxes. IMPLAN data has been
augmented by incorporating regional tax data from the NBER TAXSIM model (Feenberg and
Coutts, 1993) to represent marginal personal income tax rates by region and income class.
3.1.2 Model Structure
Production and transformation technologies. In each industry (i = 1, . . . , J) and region
(r = 1, . . . , R) gross output Yir is produced using inputs of labor (Lir), capital (Kir), natural
resources including coal, natural gas, crude oil, and land (Rir), and produced intermediate inputs
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Table 2. USREP model details.
Sectors Regions Primary production factors
Non-Energy Pacific (PACIF) Capital
Agriculture (AGR) California (CA) Labor
Services (SRV) Alaska (AK) Coal resources
Energy-intensive products (EIS) Mountain (MOUNT) Natural gas resources
Other industries products (OTH) North Central (NCENT) Crude oil resources
Commercial Transportation (TRN) Texas (TX) Hydro resources
Passenger vehicle transportation (TRN) South Central (SCENT) Nuclear resources
Final demand sectors North East (NEAS) Land
Household demand South East (SEAST)
Government demand Florida (FL) Household income classes
Investment demand New York (NY) ($1,000 of annual income)
Energy supply and conversion New England (NENGL) <10
Fuels production 10-15
Coal (COL) Europe (EUR) 15-25
Natural gas (GAS) Rest of the World (ROW) 25-30
Crude oil (CRU) 30-50
Refined oil (OIL) 50-75
Electricity generation and transmission 75-100
as represented by ReEDS model (see Section ) 100-150
>150
Xjir, j = i:8
Yir = Fir(Lir, Kir, Rir;X1ir, . . . , XIir) . (1)
We employ constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions to characterize the production
systems and distinguish four types of production activities in the model: fossil fuels (indexed by
f ={CRU, COL, GAS}), refined oil (OIL), agriculture (AGR), and non-energy industries
(indexed by n ={TRN,EIS,SRV,OTH}). All industries are characterized by constant returns to
scale (except for fossil fuels and AGR which are produced subject to decreasing returns to scale)
and are traded in perfectly competitive markets. Nesting structure for each type of production
system are depicted in Paltsev et al. (2005).
Hence, fossil fuel f , for example, is produced according to a nested CES function combining a
fuel-specific resource, capital, labor, and intermediate inputs:
Yfr =
[
αfr R
ρRfr
fr + νfr min (X1fr, . . . , XIfr, Vfr)
ρRfr
]1/ρRfr
(2)
where α, ν are share coefficients of the CES function and σRfr = 1/(1− ρRfr) is the elasticity of
substitution between the resource and the primary-factors/materials composite. The primary
8 For ease of exposition, we abstract from the various tax rates that are used in the model.
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factor composite is a Cobb-Douglas of labor and capital: Vfr = L
βfr
fr K
1−βfr
fr where β is the labor
share.
We adopt a putty-clay approach where a fraction φ of previously-installed capital becomes
non-malleable and frozen into the prevailing techniques of production. The fraction 1− φ can be
thought of as that proportion of previously-installed malleable capital that is able to have its input
proportions adjust to new input prices. Vintaged production in industry i that uses non-malleable
capital is subject to a fixed-coefficient transformation process in which the quantity shares of
capital, labor, intermediate inputs and energy by fuel type are set to be identical to those in the
base year:
Y vir = min (L
v
ir, K
v
ir, R
v
ir;X
v
1ir, . . . , X
v
Iir) . (3)
In each region, a single government entity approximates government activities at all
levels—federal, state, and local. Aggregate government consumption is represented by a Leontief
composite: Gr = min(G1r, . . . , Gir, . . . , GIr) .
Consumer preferences. In each region r, preferences of the representative consumers for
income class h are represented by a CES utility function of consumption goods (Ci), investment
(I), and leisure (N ):
Ur,h =
[
µhcr min
[
gh(C1rh, . . . , CIrh),min(I1rh, . . . , IIrh)
]1/ρcr
+ γhcr N
1/ρcr
rh
]1/ρcr
(4)
where µ and γ are CES share coefficients, and the elasticity of substitution between leisure and
the consumption-investment composite is given by σl,r = 1/(1− ρcr). g(·) is a CES composite of
energy and non-energy goods whose nesting structure is depicted in Paltsev et al. (2005) Thus,
our framework captures heterogeneity in private consumption with respect to region and income.
Households differ by expenditure patterns and income sources.
Supplies of final goods and intra-U.S. and international trade. With the exception of crude
oil, which is a homogeneous good, intermediate and final consumption goods are differentiated
following the Armington (1969) assumption. For each demand class, the total supply of good i is
a CES composite of a domestically produced (i.e., locally produced and imported from domestic
markets) variety and an imported (from foreign markets) one:
Xir =
[
ψz ZDρ
D
i
ir + ξ
z ZMρ
D
i
ir
]1/ρDi
(5)
Cirh =
[
ψc CDρ
D
i
irh + ξ
c CMρ
D
i
irh
]1/ρDi
(6)
Iirh =
[
ψi IDρ
D
i
irh + ξ
i IMρ
D
i
irh
]1/ρDi
(7)
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Gir =
[
ψg GDρ
D
i
ir + ξ
g GMρ
D
i
ir
]1/ρDi
(8)
where Z, C, I , and G are inter-industry demand, consumer demand, investment demand, and
government demand of good i, respectively, and where ZD, CD, ID, and GD, are domestic and
imported components of each demand class, respectively. The ψ’s and ξ’s are the CES share
coefficients and the Armington substitution elasticity between the domestic and the imported
foreign variety in these composites is σDi = 1/(1− ρDi ).
The domestic imported varieties are represented by nested CES functions, and we differentiate
the following structure for U.S. regions (indexed by s = 1, . . . , S) and international regions
(indexed by t = 1, . . . , T ). The imported variety of good i is represented by the CES aggregate:
Mir =

[(∑
s piist y
ρRUi
isr
)ρMi /ρRUi
+
∑
t6=r ϕitr y
ρMi
itr
]1/ρMi
if r = t[∑
t ϕitr y
ρMi
itr
]1/ρMi
if r = s
(9)
where yitr (yisr) are imports of commodity i from region t (s) to r. pi and ϕ are the CES share
coefficients, and σMi = 1/(1− ρMi ) and σRUi = 1/(1− ρRUi ) are the implied substitution elasticity
across foreign and intra-U.S. origins, respectively. The domestic variety of good i for U.S. region
s is represented by the CES aggregate:
Dir =

[(∑
s 6=r piisr y
ρSUi
isr
)ρDUi/ρSUi
+ ηir y
ρDUir
i
]1/ρDUi
if r = s
yir if r = t
(10)
where η is a CES share coefficient, and σDUi = 1/(1− ρDUi ) is the implied substitution elasticities
between the local variety and a CES composite of intra-U.S. varieties. σSUi = 1/(1− ρSUi ) is the
elasticity of substitution across U.S. origins.
Intra-period equilibrium and model closure. Consumption, labor supply, and savings result
from the decisions of the representative household in each region maximizing its utility subject to
a budget constraint that full consumption equals income:
max
{Cirh,Irh,Nrh}
Urh s.t. p
i
rIrh+p
l
rNrh+
∑
i
pcirCirh = p
k
rKrh+p
V k
r V Krh+p
R
frRfrh+p
l
rLrh+Trh
(11)
where pi, pc, pk, pV k, pR, and pl, are price indices for investment, labor services, household
consumption (gross of taxes), capital services, rents on vintaged capital, and rents of fossil fuel
resources, respectively. K, V K, R, L, and T are the benchmark stocks of capital, vintaged
capital, fossil fuel resources, labor, and the benchmark transfer income, respectively. Lacking
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specific data on capital ownership, households are assumed to own a pool of U.S. capital—that is
they do not disproportionately own capital assets within the region in which they reside.
Fossil fuel resources and vintaged capital are treated as sector-specific, whereas capital for
international regions and labor for international and U.S. regions are treated as perfectly mobile
across sectors within a given region but immobile across regions. Capital in the U.S. is assumed
to be perfectly mobile across U.S. regions but immobile across international regions. Except for
labor, all factors are inelastically supplied.
Given input prices gross of taxes, firms maximize profits subject to the technology constraints
in Eqs. (1) and (3). Minimizing input costs for a unit value of output yields a unit cost indexes
(marginal cost), pYir and p
Y v
ir . Firms operate in perfectly competitive markets and maximize their
profit by selling their products at a price equal to these marginal costs.
The main activities of the government sector in each region are purchasing goods and services,
transferring incomes, and raising revenues through taxes. Government income is given by:
GOVr = TAXr −
∑
h Tr,h − Br, where TAX, Tr,h, and B are tax revenue, transfer payments to
households and the initial balance of payments (deficit), respectively. Aggregate demand by the
government is given by: GDr = GOVr/pGr where p
G
r is the price for aggregate government
consumption.
Market clearance equations for factors that are supplied inelastically are trivial. The other
market clearance equations are as follow:
1. Supplies to the domestic market must meet demands by industry, household,
investment, and government: Dir = ZDir +
∑
h (CDirh + IDirh) + GDir .
2. Import supply of good i satisfies domestic demands by industry, household,
investment, and government for the imported variety:
Mir = ZMir +
∑
h (CMirh + IMirh) + GMir .
3. Trade between all regions in each commodity has to balance:∑
s
∑
r yisr +
∑
t
∑
r yitr =
∑
s
∑
r yirs +
∑
t
∑
r yirt .
4. Labor supply has to equal labor demand.
Intertemporal dynamics. We adopt a recursive-dynamic approach in which economic agents
have myopic expectations and base their decisions on contemporaneous variables. Solving the
dynamic model therefore involves computing a sequence of equilibria from the intra-period
model.
The evolution of capital over time is governed by the following set of dynamic equations.
Malleable capital (Km) in period t is made up of investment (It), plus the stock of capital
remaining after depreciation that also remains malleable:
Kmt+1 = It + (1− φ)(1− δ)Kmt (12)
where δ and φ denote the depreciate rate and the fraction of previously-installed malleable capital
that become non-malleable, respectively. Malleable capital is indistinguishable from new
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investment, in that there is flexibility defined by the nested CES production function to adjust the
input proportions given prevailing relative prices. As the model steps forward in time it preserves
v = 1, . . . , 12 vintages of rigid capital (Kr), each retaining the coefficients of factor demand fixed
at the levels that prevailed when it was installed.9 Each of the sector specific vintages is tracked
through time as a separate capital stock. In period t+ 1, the first vintage of non-malleable capital
is given by:
Kri,t+1,v = φ(1− δ)Kmi,t for v = 1. (13)
We assume that rigid capital cannot be reallocated among different sectors. In each sector, the
quantity of capital in each of the remaining vintages is thus simply the amount of each vintage
that remains after depreciation:
Kri,t+1,v+1 = (1− δ)Kri,t,v for v = 2, . . . , 10. (14)
This formulation means that the model exhibits a short-run and long-run response to changes in
relative prices. The substitution response in a single period to a change in prices in that periods is
a combination of the long-run substitution possibilities, weighted by output produced by
malleable capital, and no substitution, weighted by output produced with vintaged capital.
Over time, energy resources R in sector i are subject to depletion based on physical production
of fuel (F ) in the previous period:
Rr,i,t+1 = Rr,i,t − Fr,i,t . (15)
Elasticities, calibration, and model solution. As customary in applied general equilibrium
analysis, we use prices and quantities of the integrated economic-energy dataset for the base year
to calibrate the value share and level parameters in the model. Exogenous elasticities determine
the free parameters of the functional forms that capture production technologies and consumer
preferences. Reference values for elasticity parameters are taken from Paltsev et al. (2005) and
are shown in Table 3. Values for Armington trade elasticities are based on econometric estimates
from GTAP (2008).
All fossil energy resources are modeled as graded resources whose cost of production rises
continuously as they are depleted. The resource grade structure is reflected by the elasticity of
substitution between resources and the capital-labor-materials bundle in the production function.
Given the form of the production function in Eq. (2), the elasticity of substitution between the
resource and the other inputs in the top nest determines the price elasticity of supply (ζf ) at the
reference point according to:
ζf = σ
R
fr
1− αfr
αfr
. (16)
9 Because there are 12 vintages and the model’s time step is two years, vintaged capital has a maximum life of 24
years.
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Population and labor productivity growth over time are exogenous. Labor in efficiency units
(Lr,t) is scaled from its base-year value (Lr) according to: Lr,t+1 = Lr(1 + γr,t) where the
exogenous augmentation rate γr,t = γLr,t + γ
P
r,t comprises the growth of population (γ
L
r,t) and the
growth of productivity (γPr,t). γ
L
r,t is specified using population projections from United Nations
(2001) and U.S. Census Bureau (2000) for international and U.S. regions, respectively. Labor
productivity growth over time is described by a logistic function:
γPr,t =
(
γPr,0 − γPr,T
)
1+α
1+αβt
+ γPr,T . The value of the logistic parameters α and β are set such that
productivity adjusts from the initial rate to the final rate in year 2100 in an S-shaped fashion.
Growth for historical years is overridden by specifying an augmentation factor so that simulated
GDP growth matches observed historical rates over these periods.
The labor supply response within a given period is determined by the household choice
between leisure and labor. We calibrate compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticities
following the approach described in Ballard (2000), and assume that the uncompensated
(compensated) labor supply elasticity is 0.05 (0.3).
Non-price induced efficiency improvements in energy demand that scale production and
consumption sectors’ use of energy per unit of output are modeled following the concept of
autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEI) (see, e.g., Paltsev et al., 2005). We assume
for all regions that AEEI occur at a rate of 1% per year.
Numerically, the equilibrium is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (Mathiesen,
1985; Rutherford, 1995). Our complementarity-based solution approach comprises two classes of
equilibrium conditions: zero profit and market clearance conditions. The former condition
determines a vector of activity levels and the latter determines a vector of prices. We formulate the
problem in GAMS and use the mathematical programming system MPSGE (Rutherford, 1999)
and the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) to solve for non-negative prices and quantities.
3.2 A Model of Electricity Generation and Transmission Capacity Expansion
The electric sector sub-model is based on the ReEDS model (Short et al., 2009), a linear
programming model developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy
Laboratory that simulates the least-cost expansion of electricity generation capacity and
transmission in the contiguous U.S. ReEDS provides a means of estimating the type and location
of conventional and renewable resource development, the transmission infrastructure expansion
requirements of those installations, the composition and location of generation, storage, and
demand-side technologies needed to maintain system reliability. ReEDS provides a detailed
treatment of electricity-generating and electrical storage technologies, and specifically addresses a
variety of issues related to renewable energy technologies, including accessibility and cost of
transmission, regional quality of renewable resources, seasonal and diurnal generation profiles,
variability and non-dispatchability of wind and solar power, and the influence of variability on
curtailment of those resources. ReEDS addresses these issues through a highly discretized
regional structure, temporal resolution, explicit statistical treatment of the variability in wind and
solar output over time, and consideration of ancillary services requirements and costs.
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Table 3. Reference values of substitution elasticities in production, consumption, and trade.
Parameter Substitution margin Value
σen Energy 1.0
σenoe Energy—electricity 0.5
σeva Energy/electricity—value-added 0.5
σva Capital—labor 1.0
σklem Capital/labor/energy—materials 0
σam Materials in AGR 0
σae Energy/electricity—materials in AGR 0.3
σer Energy/materials—land in AGR 0.6
σerva Energy/materials/land—value-added in AGR 0.7
σrklm Capital/labor/materials—resource in primary energy 0
σgr Capital/labor/materials—resources Calibrated
σgovinv Materials—energy in government and investment demand 0.5
σct Transportation—Non-transport in private consumption 1.0
σec Energy—Non-energy in private consumption 0.25
σc Non-energy in private consumption 0.25
σef Energy in private consumption 0.4
σl Leisure—material consumption/investment Calibrated
σDi Foreign—domestic (and local) Based on GTAP, version 7
σMi Across foreign origins Based on GTAP, version 7
σRUi Across U.S. origins for international regions 2σ
M
i
σDUi Local—domestic for U.S. regions 2σ
D
i
σSUi Across U.S. origins for U.S. regions 2σ
DU
is
Note: Substitution elasticity for fossil fuel, nuclear, and hydro resource factors are calibrated according to
Eq. (16) using the following estimates for price elasticities of supply: zetaCOL = ζGAS = 1, and
ζCRU = 0.5. σl is calibrated assuming that the compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticity is
0.05 and 0.3, respectively.
Table 4 provides a list of generation and storage technologies considered in the ReEDS model.
ReEDS includes all major generator types and has additional detail for renewable generators as
these generators come with concerns that many conventional dispatchable power plants do not
have, including variations in regional resource quality, variability and non-dispatchability, and
additional transmission needs. Time in ReEDS is subdivided within each two-year period, with
each year divided into four seasons with a representative day for each season, which is further
divided into four diurnal time-slices. Also, there is one additional summer-peak time-slice. These
17 annual time-slices enable ReEDS to capture the intricacies of meeting electric loads that vary
throughout the day and year-with both dispatchable and non-dispatchable generators. See Table
A3 for a definition of time slices.
The major constraints in the optimization include meeting electricity demand and reserve
requirements within specific regions, regional resource supply limitations, and transmission
constraints. The capacity expansion and dispatch decision-making of ReEDS considers the net
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Table 4. Generation and storage technologies.
Renewable generating technologies
Onshore wind
Offshore wind
Utility-scale photovoltaics (PV)
Concentrated solar power (CSP)
Biopower
Geothermal
Conventional generating technologies
Coal
Traditional pulverized coal with and without SO2 scrubbers
Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) with or without CCS (coal-CCS)
Co-fired coal with biomass
Natural gas
Combustion turbine (gas-CT)
Combined cycle (gas-CC)
Combined cycle with carbon capture and sequestration (gas-CCS)
Hydropower
Nuclear
Oil-gas-steam
Landfill-gas
Storage technologies
Pumped hydropower storage (PHS)
Compressed air energy storage (CAES)
Batteries
Thermal Storage in Buildings
present value cost of adding new generation capacity and operating it (considering transmission
and operational integration) over an assumed financial lifetime (20 years for the present study).
This cost minimization routine is applied for each two-year investment period between 2006 to
2050.
A comprehensive documentation including data and model structure is available online (Short
et al., 2009). Here, we focus on highlighting the model features relevant for characterizing
renewable energy supplies.
3.2.1 Renewable Energy Supplies
ReEDS uses 356 different resource regions in the continental U.S. to characterize wind and
concentrated solar power (CSP) resource. Data inputs are derived from a detailed geographic
information system (GIS) model/database of the wind and CSP resource and transmission grid.
This database is used to calculate supply curves of wind and CSP, which capture sub-regional
resource quality variations and transmission costs, among other factors. Regional resource quality
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Figure 2. Regional resource resolution for wind, CSP, biomass, and PV.
variations are also considered for other renewable generator types, including hydropower,
biopower, and geothermal. ReEDS provides supply curves for these resources in each of the 134
BAs. Figures 2–4 show the resource resolution for wind, CSP, biomass, PV, hydropower, and
geothermal.
ReEDS considers five resource classes for wind based on wind power density and wind speed
at 80 meters above ground. Available land area of each wind class in each CSP/wind resource
region is derived from state wind resource maps and modified for environmental and land-use
exclusions (see Short et al., 2009). The available wind area is converted to available wind
capacity using a constant multiplier of 5 MW/km2.10
CSP performance for each CSP resource class was developed using typical DNI year (TDY)
hourly resource data National Renewable Energy Laboratory from representative sites of each
CSP/wind resource region. The TDY weather files were processed through the CSP modules of
the Solar Advisor Model (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2010) for each type of CSP
10 Fixed-bottom and floating-platform wind resource were differentiated based on water depth, where fixed-bottom
resources correspond to a shallow water depth of less than 30 meters and floating-platform corresponds to deeper
locations.
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Figure 3. Existing (2010) hydropower capacity, average hydropower capacity factor for each Power
Control Area, and new hydropower supply curve.
Figure 4. Geothermal (hydrothermal and enhanced geothermal systems) resources.
system considered in ReEDS. From this, capacity factors for each CSP resource class in each
ReEDS time-slice were developed. The CSP resource classes are defined as follows. Class 1
5-6.25 kWh/m2/day; Class 2: 6.25-7.25 kWh/m2/day; Class 3: 7.25-7.5 kWh/m2/day; Class 4:
7.5-7.75 kWh/m2/day; Class 5: >7.75 kWh/m2/day.
Annual supply curves for the biomass feedstock (ORNL, 1999) have been disaggregated to the
Power Control Area (PCA) level. The feedstock in the supply curve includes urban and mill
waste, forest and agriculture residues, and dedicated crops. Dedicated crops are predominantly in
the two most costly bins of the supply curve. The biomass supply classes are defined as follows.
Class 1: 1.64$/MMBtu; Class 2: 2.46$/MMBtu; Class 3: 3.27$/MMBtu; Class 4: 4.09$/MMBtu.
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Central PV in ReEDS represents utility-scale single-axis-tracking PV systems with a
representative size of 100 MW. Performance characteristics for central PV were developed by the
PV module of Solar Advisor Model (NREL, 2010a) using weather from typical meteorological
year (TMY) files located at all TMY3 stations throughout the contiguous U.S. (Wilcox and
Marion, 2008). The TMY site with the highest predicted annual PV capacity factor in each
ReEDS PCA was used to represent the performance (i.e., capacity factor in each time slice) of
central PV capacity installed in that PCA.
The PCA-dependent annual capacity factors for hydropower are estimated based on the
average historical annual generation from 1990 to 2007 Ventyx (2006). The capital cost supply
curve of potential new hydropower capacity are based on a resource assessment in Short et al.
(2009); three bins of hydropower resource, comprising $3500/kW, $4500/kW, and $5500/kW, are
considered. The resource assessment only considered run-of-river resources, though absent
dispatch schedules and due to coarse time slices in ReEDS, the dispatch of the existing and new
hydropower capacity is only limited by season.
Geothermal resources are concentrated in the Western interconnection with the sole exception
of limited deep enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) resource in Maine. In each PCA, a separate
capital cost supply curve is used to represent the available resource at a given cost. The PCA-level
supply curves were developed by aggregating site-specific resource assessments (Short et al.,
2009).
Variable resource renewable energy (VRRE) technologies, which include wind, CSP without
storage, utility-scale PV, and distributed PV, produce power that is both variable, uncertain, and
non-dispatchable. Generally, greater penetrations of these technologies leads to greater levels of
curtailment, required operating reserves, as well as diminished contribution to planning reserve
requirements per unit of VRRE capacity. ReEDS uses statistical calculations that rely on
simulated hourly output data for wind, PV, and CSP to characterize the variance and co-variance
of power output for each VRRE technology during each time slice. The calculations rely on the
aggregate variability for each reserve-sharing group (for the present study, the reserve-sharing
groups are assumed to be the 21 Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) regions). In general,
greater geographical distance between two sites of the same resource leads to a lower degree of
correlation between power outputs, thereby decreasing the variability of the combined generation.
Because of these correlations, all else being equal, ReEDS will choose to spatially spread
generators of the same resource to reduce aggregate variability in a reserve-sharing group.
3.3 Model Integration
In principle, a bottom-up representation of the electricity sector can be integrated directly
within a GE framework by solving Kuhn-Tucker equilibrium conditions that arise from the
bottom-up cost-minimization problem, along with general equilibrium conditions describing the
top-down model (Bo¨hringer and Rutherford, 2008). In applied work, this approach may be
infeasible due to the large dimensionality of the bottom-up problem. Moreover, the bottom-up
model involves a large number of bounds on decision variables, and the explicit representation of
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 Figure 5. Iterative solution procedure between both models.
associated income effects becomes intractable if directly solved within a GE framework
(Bo¨hringer and Rutherford, 2009).
Our computational strategy is to use a block decomposition algorithm put forward by
Bo¨hringer and Rutherford (2009) that involves an iterative procedure between both sub-models
solving for a consistent general equilibrium response in both models. The first step for
implementing the decomposition procedure in an applied large-scale setting is the calibration of
the two sub-models to a consistent benchmark point. Initial agreement in the base year is
achieved if bottom-up electricity sector outputs and inputs for all regions and generators are
consistent with the aggregate representation of the electric sector in the Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM) data.11 To produce a micro-consistent SAM, a benchmarking routine was developed for
the year 2006, the first modeled year, wherein ReEDS was solved with historical (fixed) prices for
capital, labor, and fuel as well as fixed regional electricity demands.12 Given ReEDS electricity
supplies and inputs demands, we use least-square optimization techniques to estimate a new SAM
holding fixed the (simulated) electric sector data. Our benchmarking routine implies that, in
absence of a policy shock, the integrated model is fully converged in the base year.
Each iteration in the solution algorithm comprises two steps. Step 1 solves a version of the
USREP model with exogenous electricity production where electricity sector outputs and input
11 This step is necessary to ensure that in the absence of a policy shock iterating between both sub-models always
returns the no-policy benchmark equilibrium. Violation of this initial condition means that any simulated policy
effects would be confounded with adjustments due to initial data inconsistencies between the two sub-models.
12 Wholesale electricity is an output of the ReEDS model, and remained so for the benchmarking routine. Electricity
price distribution markups were estimated for each USREP region based on the difference between the historical
2006 retail electricity price and the wholesale electricity price from the first solve of the ReEDS model.
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demands for fuels, capital, labor, and other materials, are parameterized based on the last
available solution of the ReEDS model. The subsequent solution of the ReEDS model in Step 2 is
based on a locally calibrated set of regional demand functions for electricity and a vector of
candidate equilibrium prices for fuels, capital, labor, and materials. The key insight from
Bo¨hringer and Rutherford (2009) is that a Marshallian demand approximation in the electricity
sector provides a good local representation of general equilibrium demand, and that rapid
convergence is observed as the electricity sector is small relative to the rest of the economy.13
Figure 5 shows qualitatively how the models iterate on the electricity price (P ) and demand
(Q), where P0 and Q0 represent the initial guesses, P1 and Q1 represent the second guess, and P∗
and Q∗ represent the final converged solution. To create a basis for iteration, non-linear electricity
demand from the CGE model is approximated with a regional demand function in ReEDS that is
locally calibrated based on the solution of the CGE model (i.e. points d and e in Figure 5).14 For
all other commodities, USREP simply passes commodity prices to ReEDS, and ReEDS treats
these prices as parameters for a given iteration. Both sub-models are recursive-dynamic implying
that convergence between both sub-models is first established for given time period before
moving forward in time.
As the present study represents the first application of the decomposition technique in a
large-scale applied setting, there are a number of issues and extensions of the original method that
warrant further discussion. First, incorporating a demand response in ReEDS requires modifying
the objective function. Instead of minimizing total system costs, as is the case for the native
version of the ReEDS model, the integrated model chooses generation, transmission, and capacity
decisions for each two-year period in the electric sector that maximize the sum of regional
consumer and producer surpluses (graphically shown by the area ABC in Figure 5).15 Second,
commodity prices and demands are transferred between the economic and electric sector model at
the regional level shown in Figure 5. To incorporate regional commodity price variation on
technology and fuel costs, ReEDS maps its 134 BAs and 356 resource regions to the 12 USREP
regions. Third, a consistent integration of both models needs to capture all profits earned by
sub-marginal generators in the electric sector. Profits or rents arise because of capacity,
transmission and resource constraints. In ReEDS the producer surplus represents the
sub-marginal profits of technologies/generators that produce electricity at a cost that is smaller
than the cost of the marginal generator and sell it at the market price which in equilibrium is equal
to the marginal cost. For each region, we can calculate total sub-marginal profits as the difference
between the value of electricity output and the value of inputs used to produce electricity. Profits
13 In our simulations, rapid convergence is observed—usually six to nine iterations are needed—as the electricity
sector is small relative to the rest of the economy. The U.S. electric sector represents less than 4% of GDP.
14 The demand curves represent annual electricity demand. We uniformly scale electricity demand in each time slice,
i.e. diurnal and seasonal profiles for electricity demand remain fixed throughout the solution procedure.
15 The optimization of the sum of consumer and producer surplus results in a non-linear (quadratic) programming
problem. We linearize the quadratic component of the objective function to be able to solve the ReEDS model as
a linear program.
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accrue to owners of generation and transmission capacity and are distributed proportional to
capital income.16 Fourth, implementing an economy-wide carbon policy in the integrated model
requires iterating on the price of carbon and the demand for CO2 emissions permits. We thus pass
a candidate carbon price from USREP to ReEDS, and the subsequent solution of USREP then
calculates a new estimate for the equilibrium carbon price based on demands for emissions
permits by the electricity and non-electricity sectors.
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
4.1 Scenarios and Assumptions Underlying the Simulation Dynamics
Our analysis focuses on the following five counterfactual scenarios whose specifications are
outlined in the text below:
• BAU: “Business-as-usual” case without a federal CES or RES policy but existing state
RES policies in the baseline.
• CES: Federal Clean Energy Standard.
• RES: Federal Renewable Energy Standard.
• CAT CES: Federal cap-and-trade policy covering all sectors of the economy and
achieving equivalent year-on-year CO2 emissions reductions as CES scenario.
• CAT RES: Federal cap-and-trade policy covering all sectors of the economy and
achieving equivalent year-on-year CO2 emissions reductions as RES scenario.
The CES scenario is constrained to achieve a certain clean electricity fraction target in each
modeled year, defined as the ratio of total clean energy electricity generation to total electricity
sales. The amount of generation from each technology that is considered clean depends on the
technology. Specifically, all renewable technologies (wind, solar, hydropower, biopower, and
geothermal) and nuclear are considered 100% clean, natural gas with carbon capture and storage
(CCS) is considered 95% clean, coal with CCS is considered 90% clean, and gas combined cycle
is considered 50% clean. Both existing installations and new investments in these technology
types earn a credit.17 The CES targets are assumed to increase linearly from 42% in 2012 to 80%
by 2035. Then targets increase linearly from 2035 to 2050, achieving a final value of 95% in
2050. Our specification of the CES is therefore broadly consistent with the policy outlined by the
Obama administration based on the 2011 State of the Union address and a white paper issued by
the staff of the Senate Energy and Natural Committee on March 21, 2011.
Under the RES scenario all renewable technologies, including hydropower, are considered a
100% clean. No credits are given for any other technology. The RES targets are assumed to
16 Lacking data on geographical ownership patterns of equity in the electric sector in the U.S., we use capital income
as a proxy.
17 Some CES proposals differ with respect to whether existing nuclear and hydro are treated. If they do not earn
credits, existing hydro and nuclear would be treated no differently than coal facilities under a CES, which might
seem perverse considering that an objective of the policy is to reduce emissions. A recent analysis by Palmer et al.
(2011b) using the Haiku electricity model suggests that this feature of the policy may lead to a different outcome
in terms of regional electricity price impacts.
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increase linearly from 20% in 2012 to 70% in 2050.
For each of the federal CES and RES policies, we implement a corresponding CAT scenario
that achieves the same level of economy-wide annual CO2 emissions in each modeled year. This
enables us to focus on the cost-effectiveness of the policies while holding fixed the environmental
impact. In our model, these two scenarios can also be equivalently thought of as a federal carbon
tax policy where tax rates over time equal the trajectory of equilibrium permit prices.
In addition, the following assumptions apply to our analysis. First, trading in CES credits is
national in scope and trades across state borders are not limited. As a consequence, some states or
regions will be net seller of CES credits and others will be net buyers with ensuing regional
transfers of wealth. Second, banking of CES credits is not modeled, so a MWh of clean electricity
generated in a particular year must be used for compliance in the same year. We also do not
consider borrowing of CES credits. For consistency across policy scenarios, we assume that
emissions permits also cannot be banked or borrowed. Third, we require that each policy has to be
revenue-neutral which is implemented by requiring the same level of government expenditure (in
real terms) as in the BAU. Balance of the government budget is achieved through an endogenous
non-distortionary lump-sum tax. Fourth, for the CAT policy we assume that the revenue from
emissions permits (net of what is withheld to maintain revenue-neutrality for the government
budget) is distributed lump-sum to households on a per-capita basis.18 Fifth, existing state RES
policies are included in our baseline. We assume that these programs continue to exist in our
counterfactual scenarios but that credits from a federal CES are not tradable with state/regional
RES programs. Lastly, our analysis does not consider alternative compliance payments (ACP) for
CES credits where regulated entities could make such payments in lieu of purchasing credits.
ACPs would limit the costs to the economy of imposing a CES by essentially establishing a cap
on the price of CES credits—albeit at the expense of failing short to meet environmental targets.19
4.2 National Impacts
4.2.1 CO2 Emissions
A CES (RES) policy as specified above will reduce cumulative CO2 emissions in the
U.S. electricity sector between 2012 and 2050 by roughly 51 (33)%, or 48.5 (31.4) billions tons,
relative to a baseline with no CES/RES policy. These reductions correspond to a cut of 17 (11)%
in terms of economy-wide cumulative emissions for the CES and RES scenario, respectively.
The size of annual emissions reductions will grow over time as the standards tighten (Figure
6). The CES policy is significantly more aggressive reducing emissions from electricity to 39%
18 We therefore implicitly assume that emission permits are fully auctioned. Alternatively, our scenario can also be
viewed as one that freely allocates allowances ensuring that consumers fully perceive the carbon price signal. For
example, this rules out cases where the value of freely allocated allowances is passed on to consumers in the form
of a subsidy to electricity prices either because the CAT regulation explicitly aims at sheltering some electricity
consumers or because the intent of the legislation to have electricity prices reflect the full CO2 costs is frustrated
by Public Utility Commission’s rate setting (Burtraw et al., 2001).
19 Palmer et al. (2011a) provide an analysis of the effects of ACP on the performance of a federal RES policy.
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 Figure 6. National economy-wide and electric sector CO2 emissions.
and 155% below the respective RES levels in 2030 and 2050. Up until 2038, the rate of emissions
reductions is much bigger for the CES policy and then becomes more similar during the last ten
years of the policy.
The CAT CES and CAT RES scenarios will lead to 34 and 22% cumulative emissions
reductions from electricity relative to the baseline, respectively, implying that both energy
standards will lead to roughly 1.5 times higher cumulative emissions reductions in the electricity
sector as compared to the respective cap-and-trade scenario. This suggests that a policy focused
only on the electric sector will forgo low-cost abatement opportunities in other sectors of the
economy that would be realized if marginal cost of abatement were equalized across all CO2
emitting activities—as would be the case under a comprehensive federal cap-and-trade regulation.
4.2.2 Cost-effectiveness
Table 5 compares national welfare impacts across scenarios. Change in welfare is measured in
equivalent variation (EV) as a percentage of full income, where full income includes material
consumption and leisure. Table 5 reports a weighted average of each household’s EV where a
household’s weight is proportional to its share in the total population. Holding fixed year-on-year
emissions across each pair of policies enables us to assess the cost-effectiveness of CES/RES
policies relative to the respective cap-and-trade policy.
Both regulatory standards for the electricity sector are highly cost-ineffective. Taking a net
present value (NPV) perspective, the CES (RES) is 1.9 (4) times more costly than a cap-and-trade
policy that would achieve the same CO2 emissions reductions. Because the set of credited
technologies is larger under the CES, in particular allowing full crediting of nuclear and partial
crediting of “clean” natural gas and coal, the CES is more cost-effective relative to the RES which
achieves compliance by mainly deploying high-cost wind and solar power. Note that this holds
true even though the RES is significantly less aggressive in terms of observed emissions
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Table 5. National welfare impacts.
Equivalent Variation Relative Efficiency
CES CAT CES RES CAT RES Ratio CES/ Ratio RES/
CAT CES CAT RES
Annual impacts (%)
Year 2020 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 3.9 7.3
Year 2030 -0.48 -0.24 -0.26 -0.07 2.0 3.6
Year 2050 -0.62 -0.47 -0.40 -0.19 1.3 2.1
Net present value impactsa
Percentage change -0.37 -0.20 -0.17 -0.04 1.9 4.0
Billion 2006$ -1,974.3 -1,043.0 -907.2 -227.8 1.9 4.0
Annual average per -392 -204 -180 -44
household in 2006$
Notes: Welfare impacts refer to population-weighted national averages. aDiscounted at 4% per year.
reductions than the CES. This suggests that a technology mandate in the electricity sector targeted
at deploying a substantial amount of renewables without allowing “clean” fossil-based generating
technologies to play a role will entail significant economic costs and will not be cost-effective.
Comparing the cost-effectiveness for different sub-periods of the policy horizon shows that the
relative inefficiency of regulatory policies appears to be particularly large for the first 10–20
years, but that it decreases substantially over time. This suggests that cheaper abatement options
in other sectors of the economy are available in the years following the introduction of the policy,
but that these are limited. Consequently, any cost-effective climate policy set out to achieve
sizable economy-wide CO2 emissions reductions over the next decades, will have to eventually
involve substantial abatement from the electricity sector.
4.2.3 Distributional Impacts by Income
Table 6 shows NPV welfare changes by income class across scenarios. Both the CES and RES
policies are regressive, i.e. low-income household bear a disproportionately large burden of the
economic cost. There are two key drivers for this result. First, the increase in electricity prices
under a CES/RES disproportionately affects low-income households who spend a larger fraction
of their budget on electricity (regressive uses side effect). Second, capital owners benefit from
returns on new investments in clean generating capacity. High-income households
disproportionately benefit as they exhibit higher capital income shares relative to low-income
households (progressive sources side effect).
The pattern of distributional impacts across income groups can be quite different under an
economy-wide, federal cap-and-trade program. Assuming that the carbon revenue is returned
lump-sum on a per-capita basis, both the CAT CES and the CAT RES are progressive. Note that
this is not a general result as distributional effects depend crucially on how the carbon revenue
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Table 6. National welfare impacts by income.
Income group CES CAT CES RES CAT RES
($1,000 annual income) % $ % $ % $ % $
<10 -0.54 -264 1.50 753 -0.31 -147 1.09 533
10–15 -0.50 -265 0.52 287 -0.27 -142 0.44 235
15–25 -0.49 -289 0.29 184 -0.25 -147 0.29 177
25–30 -0.46 -346 -0.07 -46 -0.23 -171 0.05 42
30–50 -0.40 -402 -0.28 -274 -0.19 -191 -0.09 -88
50–75 -0.38 -438 -0.46 -536 -0.17 -194 -0.21 -245
75–100 -0.35 -473 -0.33 -437 -0.16 -208 -0.13 -173
100–150 -0.33 -456 -0.33 -455 -0.14 -191 -0.13 -183
>150 -0.31 -499 -0.47 -770 -0.12 -198 -0.23 -369
Average -0.37 -392 -0.2 -204 -0.17 -180 -0.04 -44
Notes: Welfare impacts are population-weighted averages of net present value (NPV) of equivalent variation by
household. “$” refer to annual averages of NPV welfare impacts expressed in 2006$.
from a cap-and-trade policy is distributed (or how freely allocated emissions permits are
distributed). In fact, our per-capita allocation rule adds to the progressivity of the policy because
$1 dollar of revenue allocated to a low-income household represents a larger share of income than
$1 dollar allocated to a high-income household.
One important implication that follows from Table 6 is that a first-best market-based policy
such as a cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax generates revenue that can be used to alter
unintended distributional consequences of the policy. On the other hand, a CES or RES program
is essentially a revenue-neutral credit trading system that induces offsetting payments between
“clean” and “dirty” electricity generators. Thus, besides being cost-ineffective, a CES or RES
policy does not generate any revenue that could be used to address concerns over distributional
outcomes.20
4.2.4 Electricity Price Impacts and Equilibrium Permit Prices
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the U.S. average retail electricity price across different
scenarios and reports equilibrium CES/RES credit prices as well as carbon price for both CAT
cases. While for all policy cases price impacts are similar by 2050, showing increases on the
order of 15% relative to BAU, the equilibrium price trajectories leading up to 2050 for the
CES/RES are below the one for the respective CAT case. Differences in price impacts across
scenarios are the largest for the initial years after the introduction of the policy and the price gap
between CES/RES and CAT policies narrows over time converging in all cases to a price level of
around 16.5 cents per kWh in 2050.
20 Of course, additional policy measures to address distributional issues are conceivable, but one should be clear that
those would go beyond what is intended under a purely technology-focused CES or RES policy.
26
  
Price change:  
Price level:  
(a) (b) 
Figure 7. U.S. average retail electricity price (a) and CES/RES credit and carbon prices (b).
Differences in price impacts are due to the nature of policy instruments. First, under the
CES/RES dirty, fossil-based generators are taxed and the credit revenue is used to effectively
subsidize electricity production from clean energy sources. In contrast, under a CAT policy the
revenue from imposing a carbon charge on fossil-based generators is passed forward to
consumers in the form of lump-sum payments instead of subsidizing electricity prices. Second,
by directly incentivizing the deployment of electricity from renewable energy sources, the
CES/RES policies push in low-cost generation options that enter the dispatch order at the front
end thus pushing out the existing supply curve and lowering marginal costs. The CAT policy
mainly leads to a reduction in the use of coal with less deployment of renewable electricity. Over
time, as low marginal-cost options for renewable electricity are gradually used up and as
CES/RES targets become more stringent, price impacts across policies converge.21
Equilibrium CES and RES credit prices displayed in Figure 7 suggest that both policies are
binding immediately after their introduction. CES credit prices rise sharply to 7 cents per kwh in
2034 and remain at roughly this level for the later years of the program. The RES starts to be
binding in 2014 with credit prices rising sharply until 2034 and a more gradual increase
afterwards. Credit price trajectories under both the CES and RES suggest that a low alternative
21 Negative price changes are observed for both the CES and RES before 2034. This can be explained by the fact that
the CES requirement reduces coal capacity factors, allowing for spare coal capacity to be used to meet marginal
demand requirements inexpensively: wholesale competitive electricity prices reflect both the fixed (i.e. capital
and fixed operation and maintenance) and variable (i.e. fuel and variable operation and maintenance) costs of
accommodating an additional marginal unit of demand. A CES requires that a certain fraction f of this marginal
unit must be clean generation, while the remaining fraction (1−f ) may be dirty generation. The CES policy forces
coal plants to operate at less than their maximum capacity factors, so no additional capacity is required to meet
the dirty fraction (1− f ) of the marginal unit of demand and therefore no fixed costs are required for that fraction.
The BAU scenario, on the other hand, does not have this beneficial marginal price effect as most coal units are
operating at full potential. Thus, even though total (fixed plus variable) costs of clean generation are higher than
dirty generation, competitive prices may be lower under the CES. Also note that this effect is exaggerated at lower
values of f , i.e. prior to 2034.
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compliance payment, such as 2.1 cents per kWh, as in some recent CES and RES proposals,
would be binding from 2014 onwards and would therefore imply substantially less deployment of
clean generation technologies as well as lower CO2 emissions reductions.
An important conclusion from comparing electricity price and welfare impacts is that a policy
ranking based on electricity price impacts is misleading, i.e. one might be lead to favor clean or
renewable energy standards over a first-best carbon pricing policy such as a cap-and-trade or
carbon tax program that minimizes efficiency costs associated with reducing carbon emissions.
4.2.5 Electricity Generation and Installed Generation Capacity
Figure 8 shows electricity generation and installed capacity by technology type in each
scenario over time through 2050. In the BAU, the model shows an increasing dependence on
fossil fuels, with 72% of total electricity generation coming from coal or gas by 2050, compared
to 68% in 2010. Renewables technologies, including hydropower, provide 20% of total
generation by 2005. The CES, on the other hand, reduces conventional gas and coal generation to
11% of total generation by 2050, while renewable technologies provide 51% of total generation
and nuclear provides 38%. As the scope of the CAT CES scenario is economy-wide,
transformation of the electric sector is not as large as in the CES. Coal and gas generation reduces
to 28% of total generation by 2050, and renewable generation increases to 52% of total generation
by 2050, while the share of generation from nuclear power remains very near 20%, similar to its
share in 2012. While the RES mandates that 70% of total generation has to come from renewable
energy by 2050, it brings about a significantly smaller reduction in coal and gas generation which
contributes around 33% of total generation by 2050.
Figure 9 enables a better comparison of US installed capacity and generation by technology,
focusing on 2030 and 2050. Of the renewable generators, wind power in particular sees
substantial growth in all policy scenarios, achieving near 26% of generation by 2050 in both the
CES and CAT CES scenarios. In these policy scenarios, onshore wind contributes 19% of total
generation by 2050 but offshore wind installations also play a non-negligible role contributing to
around 7%. The share of hydropower only slightly increases from 6% under BAU to 8% in CES
and CAT CES in 2050. The second largest growth in terms of generation shares among renewable
technologies is observed for biomass electricity (including co-fired biomass) which contributes
6% under CES and CAT CES and 12% under RES by 2050 compared to BAU levels of around
1% in 2050. Biopower is closely followed by solar which provides 6% under CES and CAT CES
and 11% under RES by 2050. The generation share of geothermal is about 3% in 2050 under the
BAU case and is largely unaffected by the policies.
Figure 10 shows annual wind capacity installations and cumulative wind capacity over time
for the US. Wind growth experiences a period of rapid expansion until it reaches 350–370 GW of
installed wind capacity, and then the growth rate slows substantially. This slowing of growth is
due to a number of factors captured in the ReEDS model. For one, in its optimization ReEDS first
chooses wind sites that are the most cost-effective in that they have the best combination of high
capacity factors, nearness to transmission lines or population centers and therefore low
transmission costs, and ability to fit well with temporal demand of electricity and the types of
28
 (a)
 
(b)
Figure 8. U.S. electricity generation (a) and installed generation capacity (b) by scenario over time.
29
  
Figure 9. U.S. installed capacity and generation by technology in 2030 and 2050.
 
Annual wind capacity Cumulative wind capacity 
Figure 10. U.S. annual wind capacity installations and cumulative installed wind capacity.
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generation technologies serving a region. As these sites are used up, incremental wind generation
must move to lower quality sites. Furthermore, the increase in wind penetration reduces
dispatchability of the system as a whole and increases variability, increasing the need for reserve
capacity and increasing curtailments.
In the RES, cumulative installed wind capacity until 2036 is slightly lower than in the CES but
the patterns of annual installations under both scenarios are similar. After 2036, annual wind
capacity installations in the CES fall below 5 GW whereas they remain at about the two-fold level
in the RES through 2050. In the CES, the sharp decline in new wind capacity additions reflects
the increased role of nuclear after 2034. In the RES, the nuclear option is not available and
significant growth in wind is still required to meet the more stringent targets—together with
significant growth in PV, CSP, and biopower after annual wind capacity installations peak in
2032. The growth in wind capacity before about 2023 is much slower in the CAT CES and
CAT RES cases as most of the adjustment in the electricity sector is achieved through reducing
the reliance on coal. As carbon prices continue to rise (not reported here) reaching levels of more
than $70 per metric ton of CO2 in the CAT CES by 2034, annual wind capacity installations
exceed those under the CES and RES. By 2050, the level of cumulative installed wind capacity
across the different policy scenarios is relatively similar.
4.3 Regional Impacts
Table 7 shows NPV welfare impacts by region expressed as a percentage change and as a
per-household annual average dollar impact relative to the BAU. Regions are ordered from the top
to the bottom by their percentage welfare impacts for the CES. Both a federal CES and RES
policy lead to an unequal distribution of economic costs with a maximum difference of 0.88 and
0.71 percentage points (or $745 and $636 annual costs per household) across regions,
respectively. The CES and RES generate negative welfare impacts for all regions, while there are
some regions in the CAT cases that experience welfare gains. The fact that some regions benefit
from a cap-and-trade policy is not to say that carbon pricing itself is beneficial but that these
regions receive transfer payments due to the allocation of the carbon revenue that overcompensate
their abatement costs. Regions benefiting from a federal CAT policy are coastal
regions—California, New England, New York, and Florida—that have already de-carbonized
their economies to a large extent and that are relatively populous, thus benefiting from a
per-capita allocation scheme.
Regional welfare impacts under the CES and RES can be traced back to electricity price
impacts by region (Table 8) which in turn can be related to the generation mix in the baseline and
the policy cases (Figures 11 to 12).22 In general, the net effect on the electricity price at the state
or regional level will depend on the following two effects.23 First, the cost of supplying electricity
22 The remainder of this section focuses on comparing the BAU and CES scenarios. Supplemental figures showing
regional electricity generation and capacity installations for alternative scenarios are available from authors upon
request.
23 This is partly based on the discussion in Paul et al. (2011).
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Table 7. Regional welfare impacts.
Region CES CAT CES RES CAT RES
% $ % $ % $ % $
South Central -1.00 -908 -1.40 -1272 -0.70 -628 -0.77 -700
Mountain -0.57 -530 -0.78 -734 -0.25 -232 -0.42 -394
South East -0.52 -499 -0.25 -228 -0.28 -260 -0.08 -71
Texas -0.52 -538 -1.53 -1614 -0.36 -386 -0.84 -876
North East -0.37 -420 -0.06 -61 -0.13 -146 0.04 46
North Central -0.30 -288 -0.20 -194 -0.02 -22 -0.03 -32
Florida -0.29 -247 0.20 169 -0.25 -206 0.18 147
Pacific -0.24 -236 -0.02 -9 -0.05 -50 0.06 64
New York -0.22 -282 0.54 694 -0.11 -140 0.42 538
New England -0.16 -188 0.54 616 -0.06 -66 0.41 468
California -0.12 -163 0.24 324 0.01 8 0.23 301
U.S. -0.37 -392 -0.20 -204 -0.17 -180 -0.04 -44
Notes: Welfare impacts are population-weighted averages of net present value (NPV) of equivalent variation by
household. “$” refer to annual average of NPV welfare change per household expressed in 2006$.
from any particular technology is affected by an implicit tax due to the cost of CES credits and,
for qualifying technologies, an implicit subsidy from sales of CES credits. Second, the impact on
electricity prices will depend on changes to the electricity supply curve. On the one hand,
marginal generation costs will increase in regions that are heavily dependent on non-qualifying
capacity as these will tend to experience significant capacity retirements shifting the supply curve
to the left. On the other hand, regions that are endowed with rich, low-cost renewable resources
will tend to experience significant investments driving down marginal cost to the extent that such
technologies will enter the dispatch order at the front end; for high levels of renewable
penetration, the CES will force deployment of renewable electricity generation at sites with
relatively low capacity factors as the best site have already been used up, thus driving up marginal
cost.
Regions that are more dependent on generation fuels that are not eligible under the CES,
primarily coal, in general experience relatively large price increases. For example, North Central,
South Central, South East, and the Mountain region experience significant reductions in the use of
coal over the policy horizon and see the highest electricity price increases by 2050. However, the
regional ranking in terms of price increases varies over time with some regions experiencing
modest price impacts before 2030 while showing substantial price increases by 2050. For
example, below-average price impacts in 2030 for NCENT and MOUNT reflect high-quality,
low-cost wind resources in these regions implying—together with relatively small retirements in
coal—only a small shift of the supply curve to the left and ensuing moderate marginal-cost
increases. The relative moderate price increases for North Central for most years explains why
this region suffers only from a modest NPV welfare loss although it experiences substantial
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(b)
Figure 11. Regional electricity generation and demand in TWh (a) and installed capacity in GW (b) for
BAU.
33
050
100
150
200
250
300
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
PACIF 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
MOUNT 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
NCENT 
0
500
1000
1500
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
TW
h
 
NEAST 
0
100
200
300
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
SCENT 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
SEAST 
0
100
200
300
400
500
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
FL 
0
50
100
150
200
250
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
NY 
0
50
100
150
200
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
NENGL 
0
200
400
600
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
4
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
6
TX 
0
200
400
600
CA 
(a) Generation.
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(b) Capacity.
Figure 12. Regional electricity generation and demand in TWh (a) and installed capacity in GW (b) for
CES.
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Table 8. Regional electricity price impacts and inter-regional credit flows (CES scenario).
Region Average retail price Inter-regional credit trading (billion $)
Cents/kWh ∆% from BAU Revenues Purchases Net revenue
Year 2006 2030 2050 2030 2030 2030
North Central 6.6 4.2 22.6 9.9 8.6 1.3
South Central 7.6 10.3 21.0 3.2 4.9 -1.7
South East 7.1 7.8 16.2 12.4 20.4 -8.0
Mountain 7.0 1.3 15.7 9.6 5.3 4.4
North East 8.6 5.3 15.5 16.7 24.5 -7.8
Texas 10.4 5.1 14.6 6.7 10.7 -4.0
Pacific 11.2 4.2 12.4 5.3 0.9 4.4
California 12.9 5.8 10.7 8.3 1.1 7.1
New England 13.6 4.9 7.2 3.3 1.6 1.7
New York 15.3 4.0 5.3 2.7 1.3 1.4
Florida 10.5 3.2 4.1 4.7 3.5 1.2
U.S. 10.1 5.2 13.5 82.7 82.7 0
reductions in the use of coal and large deployment of wind power. Regions with a relatively clean
generation mix in the baseline and abundant hydro power and wind resources (Pacific), good
offshore wind resources (New England), and large resource potentials for geothermal and solar
power (California) show the smallest price increases in 2050 and bear the smallest economic
burdens.
The regional distribution of generation does change somewhat but there are no big reversals in
terms of regions changing their net trade position from being an net electricity exporter in the
BAU to a net importer in the CES. In fact, the general pattern that emerges is one where regions
that are net importers in the BAU—such as California, New York, Florida, and South
East—increase local generation in the CES and have to rely less on imports. This is to a large
extent facilitated by the possibility to substantially increase local nuclear generation.
Table 8 shows that a federal CES policy induces sizable inter-regional capital transfers that
occur in the market for CES credits. Given a CES target of around 71% by 2030 and an ensuing
equilibrium credit price of 6.5 cents/kWh, the volume of traded credits in 2030 totals to $82.7
billions. Regions with high capacity factors for renewables such as California, Mountain, and
Pacific receive the largest net capital inflows from credit trading among all regions ranging from
$4 to 7 billions in 2030. By 2030, the South East and North East regions, currently heavily
dependent on coal and nuclear, and Texas, currently dependent on coal and natural gas, are net
importers of credits financing net capital gains in other regions.
35
Table 9. Comparison of key results for a federal CES policy across different studies.
Variable USREP-ReEDS USREPa Haiku (Paul et al., 2011) EIA (2011)
NPV welfare cost (trillion $) 1.97 2.08 – –
Cumulative CO2 emissions reductions (%)
2012–2050 17 11 – –
2015–2030 24 20 24 28
Electricity price impacts (%)
Year 2030 5.4 7.4 11.3 18.3
Year 2050 13.5 10.0 – –
Wind generation in 2035 (TWh) 906 1,194 900 301
Notes: aUSREP model with “top-down” representation of electricity sector (Rausch and Karplus, 2012).
4.4 Comparison of Results with Other Studies
Table 9 provides a comparison of our results with similar studies that have investigated a
federal CES policy for electricity (with approximately similar specifications of the policy
instrument). We first compare our results to a study that uses a version of the USREP model
which represents the electricity sector in a “top-down” manner employing nested CES production
functions (Rausch and Karplus, 2012). Rausch and Karplus (2012) describe the “top-down”
model for electricity and how large-scale intermittent wind generation and regional wind
resources are introduced in a pure “top-down” CGE framework.
As is evident from Table 9, the “top-down” approach yields largely similar results in terms of
NPV welfare cost, electricity price impacts, and wind generation as compared to the
USREP-ReEDS model that features a detailed “bottom-up” formulation of the electricity sector.
The slightly larger cumulative CO2 emissions reductions obtained from the USREP-ReEDS
model are due to the fact that the share of nuclear power in total electricity generation is somewhat
higher reflecting different cost assumptions across the models. Estimates of wind generation
across both modeling approaches are roughly similar, with the USREP-ReEDS model projecting
that wind electricity is 190 TWh smaller by 2035 compared to the USREP “top-down” model.
Note that the “top-down” USREP model does only include wind in terms of renewable energy
sources, whereas the USREP-ReEDS model comprises all major renewable energy technologies.
Rausch and Karplus (2012) carry out a more detailed comparison of both approaches and find
estimates for wind electricity obtained from the “top-down” USREP model are very close to the
sum of electricity generated from all non-hydro renewables in the USREP-ReEDS model.
The results from both versions of the USREP model are close to results obtained from the
Haiku model (Paul et al., 2011). The Haiku model projects slightly higher electricity prices by
2030 as it includes average cost pricing in regions that are subject to cost-of-service regulation
whereas both USREP models assume marginal cost pricing in all regions. The NEMS model
(Energy Information Administration, 2011) projects higher electricity prices by 2030, consistent
with a more pessimistic view on the amount of wind energy that would be deployed under such a
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policy.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considered the distributional and efficiency impacts of clean and renewable energy
standards for electricity. While our analysis focused on the U.S., some of the conclusions may be
applicable in the context of other countries. Our analysis employed an integrated modeling
framework linking a global model of economic activity and energy systems with an electricity
generation dispatch and capacity expansion model for the contiguous U.S.
We find that a CES policy, broadly consistent with the proposal by the Obama administration,
and a RES policy, mandating that 70% of electricity generated in 2050 has to come from
renewable energy sources, would have significant effects on electricity sector CO2 emissions.
Cumulative CO2 emissions in the electricity sector between 2012 and 2050 will be reduced by
roughly 51% in the CES and by 33% in the RES case relative to a no-policy baseline. These
reductions correspond to a cut of 17 and 11% in terms of economy-wide cumulative emissions for
the CES and RES scenario, respectively. The CES and RES lead to extensive retirements of
coal-fired capacity and substantial deployment of wind power. Besides significant additions in
wind power, some regions show substantial investments in PV capacity (California, Texas, and
Mountain region), CSP (California and Mountain region), and geothermal (California). In regions
without abundant renewable energy resources that are subject to increasing costs with the
expansion of electricity generation from renewable sources, nuclear power is the economically
preferred approach to meeting the standard (Florida, South East, and New York).
We estimate that the CES policy modeled here is about twice as costly than a comprehensive
market-based carbon pricing policy—such as a federal cap-and-trade regulation or a carbon
tax—that achieves the same year-on-year emissions reductions. The RES policy considered here
is four times more costly as it focuses on a smaller set of technologies, in particular it does not
allow for “clean” gas and nuclear power to play a role in meeting the standard’s target. These
estimates are best viewed as providing a lower bound on the efficiency costs of CES and RES
policies. If banking and borrowing of emissions permits under a cap-and-trade program were
allowed, if emissions reductions could be achieved from non-CO2 greenhouse gases, or if the
carbon revenue was used to lower distortionary taxes, the CES and RES policies would compare
even less favorably in terms of efficiency costs.
Clean and energy standards in the electricity sector are regressive, i.e. they place a
disproportionably large burden on low-income households who spend a larger fraction of the
income on electricity relative to high-income households. Regional differences in welfare impacts
are driven by the variation in regional electricity price impacts. The general pattern is one where
regions with low cost electricity because they rely extensively on low cost coal generation see the
largest electricity price increases. However, even with larger percentage increases electricity
prices generally remain considerable lower in these regions than in others with higher current
electricity prices. Regions with abundant hydro power and wind resources (Northwestern and
New England states), with large potentials for geothermal and solar power (California) and a
relatively clean generation mix in the baseline experience the smallest price increases and bear the
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smallest burden of economic costs.
The sizable distributional effects under clean and renewable energy standards in terms of
household impacts by region and income can be problematic as these policies do not generate any
revenue that could be used to alter unintended distributional outcomes of the policy. The
revenue-neutral nature of credit trading means that the revenue from selling clean energy credits
to dirty electricity generators is used to subsidize electricity production at clean generators. In
contrast, electricity prices under a cap-and-trade24 or carbon tax policy fully reflect the carbon
price signal, and generate carbon revenue that is available to address distributional issues of
greenhouse gas policy. Assuming that the carbon revenue is recycled using equal per-capita
lump-sum transfer payments, we find that such carbon pricing policies would be progressive.25.
The results are derived in a model where the electricity sector is represented as if all regions
operated under a competitive market structure. While average cost pricing for regions with
cost-of-service regulation will not change the efficiency results of our analysis—assuming a
federal cap-and-trade policy is designed such that consumers of regulated utilities fully perceive
the carbon price signal—it may alter the distributional outcome of both technology mandates and
carbon pricing policies considered here. Further sensitivity analyses would also need to explore
the implications of varying technology cost assumptions, in particular with respect to renewable
technologies and carbon capture and sequestration options, as well as limiting the future
availability of nuclear power.
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APPENDIX A: ReEDS Model
This section describes—in simplified form—the variables, constraints, and other attributes of
the linear program formulation of ReEDS for a single year. ReEDS minimized overall electric
system costs while meeting all of the constraints of the system including new generation capacity,
time-slice-dependent electricity generation and transmission capacity. These costs represent the
20 year present value of a stream of costs. After each modeled year’s solve, ReEDS updates
values, for example existing capacity of each technology and costs of performances of new
technologies, and continues on to the next year’s solve. Variables are denoted by upper case
symbols and are defined in Table A1. The major decision variables include capacity of
conventionals, renewables, and storage along with transmission; and dispatch of conventional
capacity and storage. Lower case symbols denote parameters and are defined in Table A2. In the
following equations, “existing” or “old” refers to technologies or transmission that are already in
existence at the time of the current year, and “new” refers to potential new technology or
transmission builds.
Table A1. Sets and variables in ReEDS model.
Sets
s Regions
r Regions neighboring region s
z Time slice
g Technologies for electricity generation and storage
d ∈ g Dispatchable technologies
n ∈ g Non-dispatchable technologies
q = {o, n} Old and new technologies or transmission capacity
b Demand bins used to approximate the demand curve as piecewise constant
Variables
Y qg,s,z Average electricity generation from new (q = n) and existing (q = o) technologies in
region s in time slice z (in MW)
Ps,b Price (in $/MW)
Cqg,s New (q = n) and existing (q = o) electricity generation capacity of technology g in
region s (in MW)
Ts,r,z Average net electricity transmitted from region s to neighboring region r in time slice z
Ds,z,b Electricity demand increments in demand bin b for time slice z in region s (in MW)
Rs,z Operating reserve margin requirement in region s in time slice z (in MW)
Kqs,r Newly built (q = n) and existing (q = o) transmission capacity between region
s and r (in MW)
Sqd,s,z Generation capacity from new (q = n) and existing (q = o) dispatchable technologies
committed to providing operating reserves in region s in time slice z (in MW)
The objective is to minimize total system costs comprising fixed costs for new electricity
generation technologies, variable costs for all technologies, and transmission costs for new
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transmission builds subject to a number of constraints:
min
Y qg,s,z ,Ps,b,C
q
g,s,Ts,r,z ,Ds,z,b,Rs,z ,K
q
s,r,S
q
d,s,z
∑
g,s
Cg,sng,s +
∑
q,g,s,z
Y qg,s,z(l
q
g + eg,s)hz +
∑
s,r
Kns,rws,r (17)
subject to (1) Generation from all technologies plus imports minus exports must be greater than
demand:∑
q,g∈d
Y qg,s,z +
∑
q,g∈n
Cqg,sf
q
g,s,z +
∑
r
Tr,s,z ≥
∑
b
Ds,z,b ∀ s, z (18)
(2) Planning reserves (capacity provided by all technologies plus capacity imports minus capacity
exports must be greater than the planning reserve margin times peak demand. Dispatchable
technologies contribute full nameplate capacity toward firm capacity, whereas non-dispatchable
technologies contribute only a fraction of nameplate capacity, i.e. the capacity value).:∑
q,g∈d
Cqg,s +
∑
q,g∈n
Cqg,sv
q
g,s,z +
∑
r
Knr,s ≥
∑
b
Ds,z,b psms ∀ s, z (19)
(3) Operating reserves provided by all technologies must exceed the operating reserve
requirements:∑
q,g∈d
Sqg,s,z ≥ Rs,z ∀ s, z (20)
(4) Existing and new dispatchable electricity generators in each region and time-slice must divide
their electricity generation capacity into either providing electricity generation or providing
operating reserves. In ReEDS, there are additional restrictions on the ability of dispatchable
generators to provide operating reserves, depending on the level of flexibility of those generators:
Cqg,s,z ≥ Y qg,s,z + Sqg,s,z ∀ s, z, q, g ∈ d (21)
(5) Installed existing and new transmission capacity must exceed the power that is transferred
between regions in each time-slice:∑
q
Kqs,r ≥ Ts,r,z ∀ s, r, z (22)
(6) Installed existing and new transmission capacity must exceed the capacity that is contracted
between regions. These capacity contracts are annual, i.e. they do not depend on the time slice:∑
q
Kqs,r ≥ Kos,r ∀ s, r . (23)
Additional features in ReEDS, not shown here, include minimum loading requirements and
planned and forced outages for dispatchable technologies, curtailment from renewable and
must-run technologies, different types of operating reserves, renewable supply curves and
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Table A2. Parameters in ReEDS model.
cg,s Generation capacity of technology g in region s that is already in existence at beginning
of period (in MW)
f qn,s,z Average capacity factor for new (q = n) and existing (q = o) non-dispatchable technology
n in time slice z in region s
vqn,s,z Average capacity value of new (q = n) and existing (q = o) capacity for non-dispatchable
technology n in time slice z in region s
ps Multiplier on average electricity demand to approximate peak simultaneous electricity
demand in time slice z in region s
ms Planning reserve margin in region s
ts,r Existing transmission capacity connecting region s to neighboring region r (in MW)
ng,s Fixed costs associated with potential new electricity generation capacity of technology
g in each time slice z. This includes capital costs as well as fixed operation and
maintenance costs (in $/MW)
lqg Variable costs associated with electricity generation from new (q = n) and existing (q = o)
capacity. This includes variable operation and maintenance costs (in $/MWh)
eg,s Cost of fuel associated with electricity generation from technology g in region s.
Fuel costs depend on technology-specific heat rates and regional fuel prices (in $/MWh).
hz Number of hours contained in time slice z
ws,r Cost of new transmission connecting region s to region r. This depends on regional
differences in cost of transmission and differences in the distances between
center-points of the regions (in $/MW).
resource constraints, and contracts of variable renewable power. In addition, this representation
does not show the (non-linear) statistical calculations that occur between the model year solves.
In addition to technology-specific parameters such as the supply curves for renewable energy
resources discussed above, technologies in ReEDS are characterized generally by the cost and
performance parameters summarized in Table A4.
Incorporating a demand response in ReEDS required modifying the objective function. Instead
of minimizing total system costs, as is the case for the native ReEDS model, the integrated model
chooses generation, transmission, and capacity decisions for each two-year period in the electric
sector that maximize the sum of regional consumer and producer surpluses. Eq. (17) is thus
replaced by:
max
∑
s,z,b
Ds,z,bhzPs,b︸ ︷︷ ︸∫
under demand curve
−
{∑
g,s
Cg,sng,s +
∑
q,g,s,z
Y qg,s,z(l
q
g + eg,s)hz +
∑
s,r
Kns,rws,r
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸∫
under supply curve
. (24)
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Table A3. Time slice definitions.
Time Slice Number of Season Time of Day Time Period
Hours/Year
H1 736 Summer Night 10:00pm–6:00am
H2 644 Summer Morning 6:00am–1:00pm
H3 328 Summer Afternoon 1:00pm–5:00pm
H4 460 Summer Evening 5:00pm–10:00pm
H5 488 Fall Night 10:00pm–6:00am
H6 427 Fall Morning 6:00am–1:00pm
H7 244 Fall Afternoon 1:00pm–5:00pm
H8 305 Fall Evening 5:00pm–10:00pm
H9 960 Winter Night 10:00pm–6:00am
H10 840 Winter Morning 6:00am–1:00pm
H11 480 Winter Afternoon 1:00pm–5:00pm
H12 600 Winter Evening 5:00pm–10:00pm
H13 736 Spring Night 10:00pm–6:00am
H14 644 Spring Morning 6:00am–1:00pm
H15 368 Spring Afternoon 1:00pm–5:00pm
H16 460 Spring Evening 5:00pm–10:00pm
H17 40 Summer Peak 40 highest demand hours of
summer (1:00pm–5:00pm)
Table A4. Cost and performance parameters in ReEDS model.
Capital cost ($/MW)
Fixed and variable operating costs ($/MWh)
Fuel costs ($/MMBtu) for applicable plants
Construction period (years)
Equipment lifetime (years)
Financing costs (such as nominal interest rate, loan period, debt fraction etc.)
Tax credits (investment or production)
Heat rate (MMBtu/MWh) for fuel-consuming plants
Capacity factor for wind and solar plants
Round trip efficiency for storage technologies
Planned and unplanned outage rates (%) for dispatchable plants
Minimum turndown ratio (%) for dispatchable plants
Daily cycling penalties for coal plants
Quick-start and spinning reserve capability for plants that provide operating reserves
Emissions levels of carbon, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury
46
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge. 
FOR THE COMPLETE LIST OF JOINT PROGRAM REPORTS: 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/pubs/all-reports.php
181. Development of a Fast and Detailed Model of 
Urban-Scale Chemical and Physical Processing 
Cohen & Prinn October 2009
182. Distributional Impacts of a U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Policy: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Carbon Pricing 
Rausch et al.  November 2009
183. Canada’s Bitumen Industry Under CO2 Constraints
Chan et al.  January 2010
184. Will Border Carbon Adjustments Work? Winchester et
 al.  February 2010
185. Distributional Implications of Alternative U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Control Measures Rausch et al.  
June 2010
186. The Future of U.S. Natural Gas Production, Use, and 
Trade Paltsev et al.  June 2010
187. Combining a Renewable Portfolio Standard with 
a Cap-and-Trade Policy: A General Equilibrium Analysis 
Morris et al.  July 2010
188. On the Correlation between Forcing and Climate 
Sensitivity Sokolov August 2010
189. Modeling the Global Water Resource System in an 
Integrated Assessment Modeling Framework: IGSM-
WRS Strzepek et al. September 2010
190. Climatology and Trends in the Forcing of the 
Stratospheric Zonal-Mean Flow Monier and Weare 
January 2011
191. Climatology and Trends in the Forcing of the 
Stratospheric Ozone Transport Monier and Weare 
January 2011
192. The Impact of Border Carbon Adjustments under 
Alternative Producer Responses Winchester February 
2011
193. What to Expect from Sectoral Trading: A U.S.-China 
Example Gavard et al. February 2011
194. General Equilibrium, Electricity Generation 
Technologies and the Cost of Carbon Abatement Lanz 
and Rausch February 2011
195. A Method for Calculating Reference 
Evapotranspiration on Daily Time Scales Farmer et al. 
February 2011
196. Health Damages from Air Pollution in China 
Matus et al. March 2011
197. The Prospects for Coal-to-Liquid Conversion: 
A General Equilibrium Analysis Chen et al. May 2011
198. The Impact of Climate Policy on U.S. Aviation 
Winchester et al. May 2011
199. Future Yield Growth: What Evidence from Historical 
Data Gitiaux et al. May 2011
200. A Strategy for a Global Observing System for 
Verification of National Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Prinn et al. June 2011
201. Russia’s Natural Gas Export Potential up to 2050 
Paltsev July 2011
202. Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing: A General 
Equilibrium Approach with Micro-Data for Households 
Rausch et al. July 2011
203. Global Aerosol Health Impacts: Quantifying 
Uncertainties Selin et al. August 201
204. Implementation of a Cloud Radiative Adjustment 
Method to Change the Climate Sensitivity of CAM3 
Sokolov and Monier September 2011
205. Quantifying the Likelihood of Regional Climate Change: 
A Hybridized Approach Schlosser et al. October 2011
206. Process Modeling of Global Soil Nitrous Oxide 
Emissions Saikawa et al. October 2011
207. The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and 
Environmental Policy Jacoby et al. November 2011
208. Influence of Air Quality Model Resolution on 
Uncertainty Associated with Health Impacts Thompson 
and Selin December 2011
209. Characterization of Wind Power Resource in the United
States and its Intermittency Gunturu and Schlosser 
December 2011
210. Potential Direct and Indirect Effects of Global Cellulosic
Biofuel Production on Greenhouse Gas Fluxes from 
Future Land-use Change Kicklighter et al. March 2012
211. Emissions Pricing to Stabilize Global Climate Bosetti et al.
March 2012
212. Effects of Nitrogen Limitation on Hydrological 
Processes in CLM4-CN Lee & Felzer March 2012
213. City-Size Distribution as a Function of Socio-economic 
Conditions: An Eclectic Approach to Down-scaling Global 
Population Nam & Reilly March 2012
214. CliCrop: a Crop Water-Stress and Irrigation Demand 
Model for an Integrated Global Assessment Modeling 
Approach Fant et al. April 2012       
215. The Role of China in Mitigating Climate Change  Paltsev 
et al. April 2012
216. Applying Engineering and Fleet Detail to Represent
Passenger Vehicle Transport in a Computable General 
Equilibrium Model Karplus et al. April 2012
217. Combining a New Vehicle Fuel Economy Standard with
a Cap-and-Trade Policy: Energy and Economic Impact in 
the United States Karplus et al. April 2012
218. Permafrost, Lakes, and Climate-Warming Methane 
Feedback: What is the Worst We Can Expect? Gao et al. May 
2012
219. Valuing Climate Impacts in Integrated Assessment
Models: The MIT IGSM Reilly et al. May 2012
220. Leakage from Sub-national Climate Initiatives: The Case 
of California Caron et al. May 2012
221. Green Growth and the Efficient Use of Natural Resources 
Reilly June 2012
222. Modeling Water Withdrawal and Consumption for 
Electricity Generation in the United States Strzepek et al. 
June 2012
223. An Integrated Assessment Framework for Uncertainty 
Studies in Global and Regional Climate Change: The MIT 
IGSM Monier et al. June 2012
224. Cap-and-Trade Climate Policies with Price-Regulated 
Industries: How Costly are Free Allowances? Lanz and 
Rausch July 2012.
225. Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Clean and 
Renewable Energy Standards for Electricity Rausch and 
Mowers July 2012.
